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SHORTER ARTICLES, COMMENTS, AND NOTES
THE PUBLICPRIVATE DISTINCTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE
Abstract Does the rise of international arbitration signify a retreat of the
State from classical adjudication? In examining this question, it is important
to distinguish contract-based arbitration of individual claims against the State
from arbitration pursuant to investment treaties. The former is broadly
limited to the private sphere of the States activity, whereas the latter gives
arbitrators a comprehensive jurisdiction over public law. An elaboration of
this distinction, and the grey area within it, demonstrates that the significance
of international arbitration for juridical sovereignty is its privatization of the
authority to define the very concept of the public sphere.
I. INTRODUCTION
The heralded retreat of the State1referring to the States withdrawal from a range of
governmental functions as well as the transfer of those functions to non-State actors
poses a challenge to legal conceptions of the boundary between public and private.2 In
terms of the sovereign power finally to dispose of a legal dispute, in particular, it is said
that States are increasingly prepared to accept the transfer of adjudicative authority from
courts to arbitrators.3 Teubner argues that the expansion of international commercial arbi-
tration and lex mercatoria is reason to look beyond the State, and the positive laws of
States, and to acknowledge the emergence of transnational legal orders in which private
entities construct law without sovereign authorization.4 This is an ambitious position.
Even so, the rise of commercial arbitration does reveal a manner of retreat from the
classical model of adjudication, in that a class of disputes is no longer resolved on the
merits by judges but by private adjudicators who operate in a legal market and whose
decisions are insulated from court supervision on matters of law.5
1 S Strange, The Retreat of the State (CUP, Cambridge, 1996).
2 J Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance (2000) 75 NYU L Rev 543, 5468.
3 A Casella, On Market Integration and the Development of Institutions: The Case of
International Commercial Arbitration (1996) 40 Eur Econ Rev 155, 1559; S Sassen, Losing
Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (Columbia University Press, New York, 1996)
1416; W Mattli, Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration (2001) 55
Intl Org 919, 9236 and 9445.
4 G Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society in Teubner (ed),
Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1997) 1011; id, Contracting Worlds: The
Many Autonomies of Private Law (2000) 9 Social & Legal Studies 399, 402.
5 R Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private
International Law in an Era of Globalization (2002) 40 Col J Transnatl L 207, 21519. Note that
relevant treaties and domestic laws dealing with the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbi-
tration awards generally limit the grounds on which a court may set aside an award to error of
jurisdiction, gross procedural impropriety, or public policy; by excluding review for errors of law,
therefore, disputes are left to be resolved on the merits by arbitrators. See, eg, United Nations
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However, in defence of the classical position of the State in adjudication, the
authority for commercial arbitration and thus for the power to define lex mercatoria as
a source of law is also bounded by States,6 in that this authority originates in the States
own endorsement of an agreement of the disputing parties to withdraw a particular
dispute or legal relationship from the primary jurisdiction of the courts and subject it
instead to arbitration. Arbitration is thus defined or endorsed by the State as private
based on the States decision to respect the autonomous decisions of non-State actors
to displace the courts competence with a mutually constructed alternative.7 Accepting
(for the moment) the validity of this publicprivate distinction, the rise of international
commercial arbitration seems to offer a less compelling case for the States retreat than
the alternative scenario in which international arbitration is used to resolve disputes
within the public sphere. One may pose the question, what if States went further in the
delegation of adjudicative authority by allowing regulatory disputes between the State
and individualsthat is, disputes arising from sovereign rather than commercial acts
of the Stateto be resolved by arbitrators? Given its reconfiguration of the role of the
courts as the final arbiters of constitutional and administrative law, would this not be a
more clear concession of sovereignty?
The claim of this paper is that States have in fact taken this additional step by estab-
lishing an international adjudicative system, based on investment treaties, that gives to
arbitrators a comprehensive jurisdiction over what are essentially regulatory disputes.
In particular, I shall argue that arbitrations conducted pursuant to investment treaties
are distinct from international commercial arbitrationwhere the latter engages
disputes between the State and a private individualbecause States are assumed in the
commercial context to be acting in a private capacity. Admittedly, it is not always
possible clearly to distinguish sovereign from private acts of the State in relation to
international arbitration. But, to the extent that international commercial arbitration
affects regulatory concerns, its rubric is nevertheless limited to disputes arising from a
specific legal relationship between individual and State. In contrast, investment treaty
arbitration encompasses the full panoply of the States regulatory relations with
foreign investors who are subject to the States authority. As a result, investment
treaty arbitration is a much clearer instance of the States retreat from adjudication
because it replaces courts with a private model of adjudication in matters of public law.
The first part of this article outlines an analytical framework for distinguishing
public from private in international arbitration between individuals and States, based
on an assessment of the character of the relevant acts of the State. Further, a definition
of sovereignty is elaborated that looks to the authority of the State rather than its power
as the basis for resolving whether particular State conduct could be carried out by a
private party, or whether it is uniquely sovereign. This analytical framework is applied
in the second part of the article, in which it is argued that investment treaty arbitration
is properly viewed as public law adjudication and, as such, that it is distinguishable
372 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958, 330
UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 June 1959), Art V [hereinafter New York Convention]; Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration, 21 June 1985, UNCITRAL, UN Doc A/40/17, Annex I,
24 ILM 1302, Art 346.
6 F Snyder, Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and European Law
(1999) 5 Eur LJ 334, 3412.
7 A Redfern and M Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (4th
edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) 1389 and 256.
from international commercial arbitration, given that only the latter is reciprocally
consensual adjudication between juridical equals. In the third part of the article, the
discussion delves into the grey areas in the publicprivate distinction in the interna-
tional arbitration of individual claims against States. This leads to the conclusion that
the key significance of the rise of international arbitration, in terms of the retreat of the
State, is the granting of a generalized competence to private arbitrators to define the
scope of the public sphere and, as such, the uniqueness of the juridical sovereign.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A. The PublicPrivate Distinction
The argument begins with the premise that it is both possible and useful to distinguish
between the public and private character of disputes that are resolved by adjudication.
Of course, there is always grey when differentiating black from white, and so it is with
the publicprivate distinction. But the presence of grey does not mean that black and
white do not exist. When a legislature expropriates property, leading to a dispute with
its private owner, the passage of the legislation is quintessentially a sovereign act and
the resulting dispute quite clearly a matter of public law. Alternatively, when the
Government contracts with a company to tend the lawn in front of Parliament, the
Governments conclusion of the contract is a commercial act of the Stateone that a
private party could carry outand its resolution by arbitration can credibly be posi-
tioned within the private domain.
As with any system of classification, it may be difficult to pinpoint the difference
between public and private in specific cases. But the distinction is nevertheless drawn in
all modern legal systems, including public international law, because the recognition of
any unique subjecthere, the Statenecessitates a description of that subject.8 The
distinction is present, for example, in the principle of sovereign immunity which, in
absolute terms, posits that one States authority is not subject to adjudication in another
States courts.9 In particular, many States recognize an exception to the general princi-
ple of sovereign immunity with respect to commercial acts of the State which operates
to remove the shield of sovereign immunity from the private business conduct of the
State.10 To apply this restrictive doctrine, courts and arbitrators adopt various tests to
distinguish sovereign acts (jure imperii) from commercial acts (jure gestionis) but in
all cases a distinction is made in order to determine the scope of sovereign immunity.11
One technique for drawing this publicprivate distinction, which is adopted in this
paper, is to examine the character of relevant acts of the State and ask whether they are
acts that the State alone, as the juridical sovereign, can carry out. Thus, in I Congreso
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8 eg International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001) 43, Arts 4 and 5.
9 R Von Hennigs, European Convention on State Immunity and Other International Aspects
of Sovereignty Immunity (2001) 9 Willamette J Intl L & Disp Resolution 185, 1867.
10 Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529, 5578 (CA) [hereinafter
Trendtex]. GR Delaume, Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration (1987) 3
Arbitration Intl 28, 289.
11 eg European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, 74 Euro TS, 11 ILM 470, Art
7(1) (entered into force 11 June 1976); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 USC, 847 F Supp
61, s 1605(a) (1976) (US); State Immunity Act 1978, c 33, s 3 (UK).
del Partido, Lord Wilberforce relied on an assessment of the nature of State acts rather
than their purpose as a basis for defining the scope of sovereign immunity, supported
by this statement from the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Claim against
the Empire of Iran Case:12
As a means for determining the distinction between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis one
should rather refer to the nature of the State transaction or the resulting legal relationships,
and not to the motive or purpose of the State activity. It thus depends upon whether the
foreign State has acted in exercise of its sovereign authority, that is in public law, or like a
private person, that is in private law.
This method of distinguishing public from private is admittedly formalistic in that it
makes it imperative to define the uniqueness of the State as an entity. By adopting it
here, my aim is not to downplay the various critiques of the distinction between public
and private power, or to deny that sovereign acts benefit some individuals and groups
more than others, or to suggest that the private acts of State and non-State actors cannot
hold great significance for the public at large.13 Nor is it suggested that every dispute
can be credibly classified as public or private or that the formalized distinction drawn
here is appropriate in all instances as a method of inquiry.14 The aim here is more
modest. It is to show as clearly as possible that the establishment of international arbi-
tration as an adjudicative mechanism to resolve regulatory disputes between States and
private parties is a significant departure from the conventional use of international arbi-
tration in the commercial sphere. As Feldthusen has commented, the value of cate-
gories is less in their logic than their utility.15
In particular, I apply the publicprivate distinction to differentiate the use of inter-
national arbitration to resolve investor-State disputes under investment treaties (invest-
ment treaty arbitration) from its use to resolve investor-State disputes pursuant to
investment contracts (international commercial arbitration). The former, it is argued, is
a form of public law adjudication; the latter, a reciprocally consensual method of
dispute resolution that can be approached generally as private law. I distinguish these
two forms of arbitration by examining, in particular, two types of acts that are carried
out by the State in any arbitration involving a claim by a private party against the State.
These are: (1) the States act of consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of arbitrators as
an alternative to the courts; and (2) the States act that triggers a dispute with the party
bringing the claim. I argue that, where both of these acts are uniquely sovereign in
natureas is nearly always the case in investment treaty arbitrationthe arbitration is
best approached as public law. In contrast, where both of these acts of the State could
be carried out by a private party, the arbitration is appropriately classified as private
law.
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12 I Congreso del Partido [1983] 1 AC 244, 267 (HL), citing Claim against the Empire of Iran
(1963), 45 ILR 57, 80 (Ger Fed Const Ct). See also Republic of Argentina v Weltover, 504 US
607, 61314 (1992).
13 See Freeman (n 2) 5479; A Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian
Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy (2001) 27 Rev of
Intl Studies 133, 138; D Mullan and A Ceddia, The Impact on Public Law of Privatization,
Deregulation, Outsourcing, and Downsizing: A Canadian Perspective (2003) 10 Indiana J Global
Legal Studies 199, 245.
14 C Harlow, Public and Private Law: Definition Without Distinction (1980) 43 MLR 241.
15 B Feldthusen, The Recovery of Pure Economic Loss in Canada: Proximity, Justice,
Rationality and Chaos (1996) 24 Manitoba LJ 1, 2.
This analytical framework is used in this article to demonstrate that the advent of
investment treaty arbitration is a major development in both public law and interna-
tional law, and that its importance would be underestimated were it collapsed into a
wider debate about the emergence of transnational law or the commonalities in public
and private values.16 Indeed, the proclivity of some commentators to overlook the
uniqueness of the sovereign as a juridical entity17 tends to mask the importance of this
emerging system as a rare expression of public law on the international plane.18 Of
course, with black and white there is always grey. Thus, after presenting the argument
in Section III that investment treaty arbitration is a form of public law adjudication, the
discussion turns in Section IV to two cases in which the publicprivate distinction
becomes blurred. The first is where a stabilization clause in a contract allows an arbi-
tration tribunal to find that a modification of a States regulatory regime is a breach of
contract; the second, where an umbrella clause in an investment treaty permits a
tribunal to characterize a breach of contract by the State as a violation of the treaty. In
the case of a stabilization clause, the State consents in a contract to resolve regulatory
disputes arising from activity that is clearly sovereign in character; in the case of an
umbrella clause, the States treaty-based (ie sovereign) consent may be read to autho-
rize the arbitration of disputes arising from an alleged breach of contract by the State.
In each case, therefore, both of the relevant acts of the Statethe act of consent and
the act triggering the disputedo not fall within either the sovereign or the commer-
cial realm of State activity.
B. Juridical Sovereignty and the Adjudication of Regulatory Disputes
Globalization has provoked a great deal of debate about sovereignty. Yet, partici-
pants in the debate sometimes refer to the decline of sovereignty without accounting
for different meanings of the term.19 If one speaks of sovereignty only as the power
of a State to control the destiny of its people and territory, then sovereignty has no
doubt diminished for most if not all States through forces of globalization.20 But is
this anything new? In a society of States, the ability of any one State to effect its will
over others, or over non-State actors, will vary over time. On the other hand, if one
speaks of sovereignty as a juridical concept then rumours of the end of sovereignty
are exaggerated.21 Globalization has changed how power is distributed among States
and the degree to which States can control the activities of individuals and 
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16 Teubner (1997) (n 4) 7; D Oliver, Common Values and the PublicPrivate Divide
(Butterworths, London, 1999) 12.
17 eg CN Brower, CH Brower II, and JK Sharpe, The Coming Crisis in the Global
Adjudicative System (2003) 19 Arbitration Intl 415, 415 (characterizing all investment disputes
as commercial disputes).
18 G Van Harten and M Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global
Administrative Law (2006) 17 EJIL 121, 122.
19 BR Roland, The Access of Individuals to International Trade Dispute Settlement (1996)
13 J Intl Arb 143, 146 (arguing that [T]he foremost goal of trade law is to surmount outdated
principles of State sovereignty for the sake of individual welfare); Cutler (n 13) 1347.
20 R Jackson, Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical
Landscape (1999) 47 Pol Studies 431, 453.
21 R Palan, Trying to Have Your Cake and Eating It: How and Why the State System Has
Created Offshore (1998) 42 Intl Studies Q 625, 630; G Sorensen, Sovereignty: Change and
Continuity in a Fundamental Institution (1999) 47 Pol Studies 590, 604.
organizations, but it has not seriously challenged the concept of juridical sover-
eignty.22
In the juridical sense, sovereignty is a conceptual framework for understanding the
representative relationship between the State and individuals within its territory, and as
such for organizing the public sphere.23 Sovereignty means that the State is treated as
the entity that represents a group of people in relation to each other and in relation to
other States. Sovereignty is a matter of authority, not control.24 As an ideal, sover-
eignty implies external autonomy and internal control on the part of the State, but
neither fully exists in reality. Rather, sovereignty is a means to conceptualize how
people are organized into political entities and legal persons. In particular, as the repre-
sentative of a defined political group, the State has rights and duties that can be exer-
cised only in the States representative capacity; that is, only on behalf of the political
group.25 So long as there are States endowed with the authority to conclude treaties,
pass legislation, impose taxes, define and assign property rights, enforce judgments,
assume public debt, and so on, then juridical sovereignty remains essential in the orga-
nization of international society and economy.26
A particular class of disputes may arise between the State and individuals who are
subject to the exercise of public authority by the State. For present purposes, I refer to
these disputes as regulatory disputes and distinguish them from other public disputes
(ie between States entities or between States themselves) on the ground that they involve
a claim made directly against the State by a private party. More importantly, regulatory
disputes can also be distinguished from private disputes that arise between individuals
acting in a private capacity (although the relationship between those individuals may
itself be subject to State regulation).27 Thus, in international commercial arbitration, a
partys consent to arbitrate takes place within the private sphere not because the consent
is irrelevant to the public in general but because the disputing partiesacting in a
private capacityhave agreed to use a particular method of dispute resolution in
disputes arising between themselves.28 They have agreed, in a manner endorsed by the
376 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
22 I Wallerstein, States? Sovereignty? in DA Smith, DJ Solinger, and SC Topik (eds), States
and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (Routledge, London, 1999) 23; M Koskenniemi, What
Is International Law For? in MD Evans (ed), International Law (OUP, Oxford, 2004) 96; Jackson
(n 20).
23 Jackson (n 20) 432; I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, OUP,
Oxford, 2003) 119 and 289; M Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1992) 58 and 93.
24 C Tollefson, Games without Frontiers: Claims and Citizen Submissions under the NAFTA
Regime (2002) 27 Yale J Intl L 141, 144.
25 WI Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (University of London Press, London, 1959)
312; D Cohen and JC Smith, Entitlement and the Body Politic: Rethinking Negligence in Public
Law (1986) 64 Canadian Bar Rev 1, 56; C Harlow and R Rawlings, Law and Administration
(Butterworths, London, 1997) 5 and 415; Loughlin (n 23) 6, 78, and 82.
26 eg Victory Transport case, 35 ILR 110, US District Court of Appeals (characterizing as
exclusively sovereign: internal administrative acts, such as the expulsion of an alien; legislative
acts, such as nationalization; acts concerning the armed forces; acts concerning diplomatic activ-
ity; and public loans); Waste Management Inc v United Mexican States (Merits) (30 Apr 2004),
43 ILM 967, 16(4) World Trade and Arb Mat 3, para 174 (Any private party can fail to perform
its contracts, whereas nationalization and expropriation are inherently governmental acts).
27 A Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation (1976) 89 Harv L Rev 1281,
12824.
28 AS Rau, Integrity in Private Judging (1997) 38 South Texas L Rev 455, 4867; Redfern
and Hunter (n 7) 131.
State, to insulate the adjudication of their dispute from the courts and subject it instead
to arbitration. In contrast, the submission of governmental decisions to review by a
particular adjudicative process is a policy choice by the State to use that method of
adjudication as part of the governing apparatus.29 Public law adjudication is distinct
from reciprocally consensual adjudication in the private sphere because the State acts
in a sovereign capacity when it consents to the adjudication and because the relevant
dispute arises from the exercise of sovereign authority by the State. I discuss this in
more detail below.
III. THE ADVENT OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
Contemporary investment treaties establish a novel international adjudicative regime that
regulates States in order to protect the assets of foreign investors (typically, multinational
firms) from various forms regulation by States in whose territory such assets are
located.30 Through hundreds of treaties concluded from the late 1960s, and above all in
the 1990s,31 investors have been given the ability to bring internationally enforceable
damages claims in relation to future disputes arising from sovereign (as opposed to
merely commercial) acts of the State, generally without the duty to exhaust local reme-
dies.32 This is a major reform given that in customary international law individuals had
no such right and, to the extent that States historically provide a comparable treaty-based
right to individuals, it was limited to disputes arising from a specific historical event such
as a war or revolution.33 Under the contemporary investment treaties, States give arbitra-
tors a comprehensive (or generalized) jurisdiction34 to resolve individual claims beyond
the broad supervisory authority of domestic courts. The advent of investment treaty arbi-
tration is thus unique because it entails a prospective consent by States to the compulsory
international arbitration of disputes with investors in the regulatory sphere.
More important for present purposes is that States have incorporated a private
model of adjudicationoriginally designed for the resolution of international commer-
cial disputesinto the procedural design and enforcement structure of investment
treaties. As a result, investment treaty arbitration is frequently analogized to interna-
tional commercial arbitration.35 The two forms of arbitration are similar in that both
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29 M Damasùka, Activism in Perspective (1983) 92 Yale LJ 1189, 11912; Loughlin (n 23) 5
and 12.
30 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003 (United Nations, New York, 2003) c IV.
31 Including both bilateral investment treaties and regional agreements that contain provisions
on compulsory investment arbitration. See, eg, UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties
19591999 (United Nations, New York, 2000); North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 Dec
1992, 32 ILM 296 and 605 (entered into force 1 Jan 1994), Arts 1116 and 1117; Energy Charter
Treaty, 17 Dec 1994, 35 ILM 509, Art 26.
32 See Van Harten and Loughlin (n 18).
33 eg the Alabama Claims Arbitration established after the American Civil War, the Mixed
Tribunals and Claims Commissions after the First World War, the IranUnited States Claims
Commission after the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the UN Compensation Commission after the
Gulf War of 19901. See J Collier and V Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law
(OUP, Oxford, 1999) chs 1 and 3.
34 J Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity (1995) 10 ICSID Rev 232, 233, and 240.
35 eg Mattli (n 3) 945; DF Donovan Introduction to ArticlesDallas Workshop on Arbitrating
with Sovereigns (2002) 18 Arbitration Intl 229, 229; GA Alvarez and WW Park, The New Face
of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11 (2003) 28 Yale J Intl L 365, 393; Brower et al (n
17) 415 and 4325. See also SJ Toope, Mixed International ArbitrationStudies in Arbitration
allow a private party to bring a claim before a tribunal, the members of which are
appointed by the disputing parties rather than a public authority.36 Also, the proceed-
ings are governed by rules originating in private arbitration,37 and the professional
backgrounds of many arbitrators are in the area of commercial law. Further, the main
remedy is a damages award that is enforceable under the New York Convention and
other instruments of international commercial arbitration.38 Finally, rules of arbitration
and domestic laws typically call for courts to show deference to arbitration awards in
order to promote stability and predictability in the use of arbitration in international
commerce. Even so, in spite of these commonalities the analogy between investment
treaty arbitration and commercial arbitration confuses form with substance. As
discussed in the next section, in investment treaty arbitration both the States consent
to arbitration as well as the act of the State that triggers a claim by a private party are
predominantly sovereign in nature, whereas in commercial arbitration they are private
or commercial.
A. The Sovereign Character of Investment Treaty Arbitration39
The authority for international commercial arbitration is private in that it stems from
the autonomy of individuals to order their affairs as they wish. Thus, although a State
can consent in a contract to the arbitration of disputes that arise from a relationship with
another private party, so too can any private individual. Also, like any individual a
State can also enter into and breach a commercial agreement with another private party.
In both circumstances, the law deems the State to have shed the cloak of sovereignty
and descended into the commercial sphere.40 In the words of Lord Denning in
Trendtex: If a government department goes into the market places of the world and
buys boots or cementas a commercial transactionthat government should be
subject to all the rules of the marketplace.41 The fundamentally unequal relationship
between juridical sovereign and private individual is thus transformed into a relation-
ship in which both parties are capable of possessing the same legal rights and duties.
In turn, an arbitration arising from this relationship can be understood as private
because its authority derives from the consents of the disputing parties, mutually given
in the context of a reciprocal relationship between juridical equals, both acting in a
private capacity.
Compare this with the States participation as juridical sovereign in an international
arbitration. Under investment treaties, the authority for the arbitration of claims against
378 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
Between States and Private Persons (Grotius Publications, Cambridge, 1990) 389 (noting the
tendency to approach investment arbitration purely as a subcategory of international commercial
arbitration and thus infused with the values of that process).
36 The presiding arbitrator is normally appointed, in the absence of agreement between the
disputing parties, by a designated appointing authority.
37 eg ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, rev 26 Sept 1984 and 1 Jan 2003
(original rules 1968), reprinted in Convention, Regulations and Rules (ICSID, Washington, 2003)
93; Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNGA Res
31/98, UN GAOR, 31st Session, Supp No 17, UN Doc A/31/17, c V, s C (1976); and Rules of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, rev 1 Jan 1998 (original rules 1922), online:
International Chamber of Commerce <http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp>.
38 New York Convention (n 5).
39 For a more detailed discussion, see Van Harten and Loughlin (n 18) 13945.
40 eg Congreso del Partido (n 12). 41 Trendtex (n 10) 558.
the State comes from the agreement of the State parties to the treaty to permit the use
of adjudication to resolve disputes arising from their exercise of sovereign authority
over each others nationals.42 When a State agrees by treaty to the arbitration of invest-
ment disputes in general, the State acts in a uniquely sovereign capacity. The consent
is not limited, as in commercial arbitration, to an existing dispute that is known in
advance to the consenting party or to disputes arising from a particular relationship
between juridical equals. Rather, the State is unilaterally exposed to claims by a broad
class of potential claimants in relation to governmental acts that affect the assets of
foreign investors. The disputes that lead to individual claims under investment treaties
typically arise from acts that entail the exercise of authority that is unique to the State,
such as the passage of legislation, the adoption of mandatory regulations, or the
issuance of judicial decisions.43 The general consent is uniquely sovereign, therefore,
because it is a prospective consent to the compulsory arbitration of regulatory disputes
with investors as a group.44
In light of the general consent, investment treaties give arbitrators a comprehensive
jurisdiction to resolve a broad class of disputes arising from sovereign acts of the State,
instead of a contract-specific competence to resolve disputes arising from a specific
commercial relationship. But this does not itself pose a challenge to juridical sover-
eignty, however much it may reduce the ability of States to control the activities of
multinational firms. By acting on the general consent a tribunal exercises authority that
is delegated by States; only the State can grant to an individual the authority to adjudi-
cate a regulatory dispute within its territory.45 This authority to delegate is inherently
sovereign because it stems from the representative status of the State in relation to the
population and political group that is associated with its territory.46 As such, juridical
sovereignty remains fundamental to the establishment of any treaty-based adjudicative
regime. Further, an arbitrator who is given comprehensive jurisdiction over a claim
filed under an investment treaty is as much an official of the State as judges who are
appointed for life by a government or directly elected by voters. They are differentiated
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42 Chayes (n 27) 12945 and 1302. See also EV Abbot, The Police Power and the Right to
Compensation (1889) 3 Harv L Rev 189; LL Fuller, Consideration and Form (1941) 41 Col L
Rev 799, 8068.
43 eg SD Myers, Inc v Government of Canada (Merits) (12 Nov 2000), 40 ILM 1408, 15(1)
World Trade and Arb Mat 184 [claim arising out of a legislative prohibition on waste exports]; CMS
Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic (Merits) (12 May 2005), ICSID Case No
ARB/01/8, online: Investment Treaty Arbitration <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CMS_
FinalAward.pdf>, para 536 [legislative reform of currency system]; Metalclad Corporation v
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not by the character of their authority but by the status of their office. Both exercise the
ultimate decision-making authority of the juridical sovereign in public law. 
B. The Investors Consent
The discussion thus far has focused on the sovereign character of the States consent in
an investment treaty. However, some commentators look to the investors consent in
order to position investment treaty arbitration within the private sphere.47 They do so
by linking the investors consent to the treaty consent of the respondent State, in order
to establish a classical agreement to arbitrate as understood in commercial arbitration.
This conceptual approach is critically analysed here.
When an investor consents to the arbitration of a dispute with a State under a treaty,
acting on the standing offer made by the States general consent, the investor invokes
a governing arrangement that was originally established by an agreement between
States. The investors consent is an acceptance of a remedial opportunity provided by
States to a particular class of individuals. In particular, the investor seizes an opportu-
nity to seek damages for a States alleged breach of international standards that regu-
late States. This opportunity is made available by an inter-State bargain, not a private
agreement, and it relates to regulatory rather than commercial disputes. As such, the
investors consent in investment treaty arbitration differs from the consent of a private
party in commercial arbitration.
To elaborate, under an investment treaty an investor must choose whether to resort
to arbitration only after the relevant dispute has arisen. The investors consent is retro-
spective, ie it is specific to disputes arising from the regulatory relationship with a
State.48 Unlike the respondent State, the investor does not commit to the compulsory
arbitration of any future dispute with the State, at the instance of the State. Tribunals
are not given general jurisdiction to award damages against investors for violations of
standards that regulate businesses or protect the interests of host States. Generally
speaking, it is States that are sanctioned and investors that are compensated.49 Indeed,
for a foreign investor to be sanctioned via compulsory international arbitration in the
context of a regulatory dispute would require the consent of the investors home State,
not the investor.50 In investment treaty arbitration, the investors consent is always
specific, just as the States consent is always general.
In short, an investors decision to submit a dispute to investment treaty arbitration
is more like the decision of an individual to seek damages against the State under
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domestic public law than the decision to seek damages against another individual in
private law. It is a consent of privilege rather than reciprocal obligation. This does not
make the investors consent insignificant. Depending on the terms of the relevant
treaty, the investors submission of a dispute to treaty arbitration can have important
legal ramifications. It may require the investor to relinquish rights under domestic law.
But these conditions of access to the system are based not on an agreement made by
the investor but on a regime established by States.
IV. GREY AREAS IN THE PUBLICPRIVATE DIVIDE
The analysis presented above follows from the principle that some forms of authority
are unique to the juridical entity of the State. This principle has informed my exami-
nation of the two types of State acts that are relevant to the international arbitration of
individual claims against States. But it would be foolhardy to suggest that the distinc-
tion between public and private is always clear-cut. In this section, I review two forms
of international arbitration which straddle the publicprivate divide. The first involves
the use of contract-based arbitration to resolve regulatory disputes arising from sover-
eign acts of the State, while the second involves the treaty-based arbitration of contrac-
tual disputes arising from commercial acts of the State. Both reveal exceptional aspects
of the relationship between international arbitration and the retreat of the State. On the
other hand, this discussion should not be taken as an abandonment of the view that
investment treaty arbitration is a form of public law adjudication, or that the signifi-
cance of investment treaties lies in their delegation of the judicial function in public law
to private arbitrators.
A. Contract-Based Arbitration of Regulatory Disputes
As discussed earlier, when a State consents by contract to the compulsory international
arbitration of disputes arising from a contract, the State acts in a private capacity. This
remains the case when a contract between a private party and a State entityconcern-
ing an investment by the private party in the States territorycontains an arbitration
clause. The contract is an investment agreement and the arbitration of disputes arising
from the agreement is contract-based investment arbitration, broadly analogous to
international commercial arbitration, because the acts of the State giving rise to the
dispute as well as the specific nature of the States consent are both private acts. On
this basis, contract-based investment arbitration is distinguishable from public law
adjudication.
Yet, some investment contracts put obligations on the State Party to the contract
that are clearly binding on the State (and only the State) in its sovereign capacity. This
is the case where a contract contains a stabilization clause that purports to obligate
the State to maintain, for a long-term period, the regulatory framework that applies to
the investment at the time the investment is made.51 Stabilization clauses have an
established history and are widespread in the context of NorthSouth investment flows.
Thus, for instance, the exploration and development of oil in Chad, which in 2003
began to pump crude for export through Cameroon, is based on a series of long-term
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contracts between Chad and an international oil consortium led by Exxon Mobil.52
Each of these contracts contains a stabilization clause, exemplified by Article 34.3 of
the 2004 agreement between Chad and the consortium:53
During the period of validity of this document, the State shall ensure that it shall not apply
to the Consortium, without prior agreement of the Parties, any future governmental acts
with the duly established effect of aggravating, directly, as a consequence, or due to their
application to the shareholders of the Consortium, the obligations and charges imposed by
the provisions of this Convention or with the effect of undermining the rights and economic
advantages of the Consortium or its shareholders . . . Only the Consortium shall be able to
cite this stability clause, which is offered to it to the exclusion of any third party to this
Convention . . .
Any of the corporate members of the oil consortium may resort to compulsory arbitra-
tion, pursuant to the contract, should it conclude that its rights under the stabilization
clause were adversely affected by regulatory reforms adopted by Chad, whether based
on new or existing laws.
The stabilization clause thus restricts the policy options available to Chads
Government, and to the people represented by the State of Chad, in relation to the oil
project for a substantial period (at least 30 years in this case). The clause does so to
safeguard the anticipated returns of the oil consortium, once its initial costs are sunk,
from the possibility that a future government might seek to increase the States share
of the revenues generated by the project. On the other hand, such clauses are open to
the criticism that the current governmentin this case, with advice and financing from
the World Banksacrificed too much on the altar of economic development. Thus,
Amnesty International has campaigned against the stabilization clauses accepted by
Chad in this case on the basis that they could frustrate the protection of human rights
in the country.54 And so they could, but only as part of a wider bargain to gain access
to the technology, know-how, and other resources of multinational firms.55 Chad has
traded away some of its policy options in exchange for private investment in its oil
sector.
The wisdom of Chads acceptance of these stabilization clauses is an important
question, although not for our present purpose. The more narrow concern here is with
whether this particular use of international arbitration to constrain the State, based on
a contract, is a matter of public or private law. Two questions are pertinent. The first is
whether the acts of Chad that are bound by the stabilization clause, whether tied to the
protection of human rights or other governmental imperatives, exist only if one accepts
the principle of juridical sovereignty. The answer, quite clearly, is yes. The clause
refers to governmental acts. It applies to the passage of any law or regulation, though
general in its application, which detrimentally affects the rights and economic advan-
tages of the private contracting parties. It is one-sided in that it only binds the contract-
ing State. It is a legal mechanism to secure the economic interests of an international
combine against the danger posed by the right of a self-governing people to determine
their future. Juridical sovereignty in this respect serves as the framework by which the
population of a territory can bind itself so as to enhance the security of foreign capital.
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It provides the conceptual foundation for the contractual constraint of sovereign acts of
a State.56
This leads to the second question: whether Chads consent to the compulsory arbi-
tration of disputes arising from such acts, where they affect the rights and interests of
members of the oil consortium, is also a sovereign act. Put differently, can a State
acting in a private capacityconstrain its regulatory conduct over the long term by
agreeing to a contract and, in particular, to a compulsory arbitration clause? The answer
might be no if one concluded that, in principle, the character of any act of consent can
be defined only by examining the nature of the acts that are bound by the consent. That
is, inherent to a States consent in a private capacity is the assumption that the State can
only bind itself in relation to acts that a private party could carry out. By consenting in
a contract to the compulsory arbitration of disputes arising from the contract, therefore,
a State acts in a private capacity only to the extent that the relevant disputes themselves
arise from private acts of the State. Were the State to bind itself with respect to sover-
eign conduct, then the consent itself must also be viewed as a sovereign act given that
no private party could refrain from amending legislation, introducing new regulations,
etc. Based on this line of reasoning, the mere fact that the authority for an arbitration
stems from an agreement to arbitrate in a contract, does not itself constitute the arbi-
tration as commercial arbitration. One needs to look more closely at the acts that are
purportedly bound in order to ascertain whether the contract-based consent is in fact a
commercial act.
This reasoning is attractive in principle, but it poses a practical problem for the
facilitation of international commerce between private parties and States. The diffi-
culty is that if States are deemed to be unable to commit, by contract, to refrain from
regulatory interference with the rights and interests of private parties, they would be
deprived of a legal vehicle for the promotion of their own development, particularly
in the resource sector, by entering into long-term concessions with foreign firms.
More to the point, international business would face greater risk when entering into
transactions with State entities, thus increasing the cost of resource exploitation in
much of the world. These considerations have led courts and arbitrators to adopt vari-
ous mechanisms to enforce contracts that bind sovereign acts of a State party, includ-
ing the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity; the reading of a contractual consent
by a State to compulsory arbitration as an implied waiver of immunity; and (ambi-
tiously) the characterization of international arbitration itself as a special adjudicative
regime that exists beyond the domestic sphere and is thus exempt from claims of
sovereign immunity.57 What these mechanisms have in common is a tendency to
understate the sovereign nature of the State conduct that is bound by a contract-based
consent to arbitration. Each also undergirds the use of contract-based arbitration as an
international governing arrangement aimed at regulating States (mainly in the devel-
oping world) in support of international commerce and the business security of multi-
national firms.
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Thus, in rejecting pleas of sovereign immunity by States as a bar to the jurisdiction
of commercial arbitration tribunals over disputes arising from sovereign acts of the
State, Wetter argues:58
Acceptance of the plea would militate against one of the most fundamental notions of the
international arbitral process . . . Innumerable, carefully balanced agreements are extant in
the entire world to which states and state entities are parties and in which an equilibrium
on the procedural level has been achieved principally by the contractual creation of mutu-
ally binding arbitration provisions. No international tribunal could deny and render nuga-
tory the existence and effectiveness of the ultimately determinative adjudicatory element
of such an immense, complex and important network of financial, trade and investment
contracts, created by the desires of states and private parties in response to the needs of
international commerce.
This is essentially a policy argument. The claim is that the extensive participation by
States in international commerce requires arbitrators to give effect to contract-based
consents of States, even where the consent purports to bind the sovereign conduct of
the State. It may thus be seen as a decision to bridge the publicprivate divide in a way
that constitutes commercial arbitration as an appendage of an international governing
apparatus.
B. The Texaco Arbitration
A classic example of this use of contract-based arbitration to bind sovereign acts of the
State is the award in the Texaco arbitration of 1977,59 in which the French academic
René-Jean Dupuy ordered Libya to perform specifically its obligations under a 50-year
oil concession agreement dating from 1955, based on this stabilization clause:
The Government of Libya will take all steps necessary to ensure that the company enjoys
all the rights conferred by this concession. The contractual rights expressly created by this
concession shall not be altered except by mutual consent of the parties.
This Concession shall throughout the period of its validity be construed in accordance
with the Petroleum Law and the Regulations in force on the date of execution of the agree-
ment of amendment by which this paragraph (2) was incorporated into the concession
agreement. Any amendment to or repeal of such Regulations shall not affect the contrac-
tual rights of the Company without its consent.
Following Colonel Qadhafis overthrow of Libyas Western-backed monarchy in
1969, Libya adopted a more aggressive bargaining stance toward foreign oil compa-
nies.60 By 197374, this led to the enactment of decrees nationalizing the rights, inter-
ests and property of Texaco Overseas Petroleum and the California Asiatic Oil
Company as granted under the oil concession of 1955. Based on the dispute settlement
provisions of the concession agreement, the oil companies resorted to international
arbitration, in which the Qadhafi Government refused to participate. Proceeding under
the contract, the President of the International Court of Justice appointed Mr Dupuy as
sole arbitrator. In the course of interpreting the concession agreement, Dupuy exam-
ined the applicability of its stabilization clause to Libyas acts of nationalization:61
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The Deeds of Concession entered into by the parties do not include any provision by which
the Libyan Government limited its recourse to nationalization. However, Clause 16 of the
Deeds of Concession contains a stabilization clause with respect to the rights of the conces-
sion holder . . .
Such a provision, the effect of which is to stabilize the position of the contracting
party, does not, in principle, impair the sovereignty of the Libyan State. Not only has the
Libyan State freely undertaken commitments but also the fact that this clause stabilizes
the petroleum legislation and regulations as of the date of the execution of the agreement
does not affect in principle the legislative and regulatory sovereignty of Libya. Libya
reserves all its prerogatives to issue laws and regulations in the field of petroleum activ-
ities in respect of national or foreign persons with which it has not undertaken such a
commitment. Clause 16 only makes such acts invalid as far as contracting parties are
concernedwith respect to whom this commitment has been undertakenduring the
period of applicability of the Deeds of Concession.
As such, it was concluded that an earlier Libyan government could validly undertake
contractual obligations that bound sovereign acts of Libya for the long term, including in
particular the acts of nationalization taken by the post-revolutionary government. In addi-
tion, Dupuy took the additional step of justifying the imposition of this contract-based
constraint on Libyas sovereign conduct by characterizing the concessionary agreement
as an internationalized agreement, ie as a special type of contract that is separated
from the domestic law of any State.62 He concluded:63
Thus, in respect of the international law of contracts, a nationalization cannot prevail
over an internationalized contract, containing stabilization clauses, entered into between
a State and foreign private company. The situation could be different only if one were to
conclude that the exercise by a State of its right to nationalize places that State on a level
outside of and superior to the contract and also to the international legal order itself, and
constitutes an act of government which is beyond the scope of any judicial redress or
any criticism.
Dupuys interpretation of the contract can be summarized in this way: the long-term
concession entered into by Libya, because it contained both a stabilization clause and
an arbitration clause, was an internationalized agreement that authorized arbitrators to
rule on the legality of Libyas nationalization, regardless of its domestic law. Based on
this finding, Dupuy ordered specific performance by Libya in favour of the oil compa-
nies, which later settled for monetary compensation.
Dupuys decision was no doubt motivated by the same considerations that underlie
the stabilization clauses entered into by Chad; that is, it puts aside sovereign preroga-
tives in order to facilitate the States participation in international commerce and, in
particular, to provide a stable legal framework for international business. One can
apply various criticisms to this justification, in addition to the human rights critique of
Amnesty International. For example, the policy only follows from the assumption of a
capitalist global economy in which capital flows are organized, technology transferred,
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and markets opened up mainly by profit-based decision-making in a small number of
private firms based, for the most part, in industrialized countries.64 From this perspec-
tive, contractual constraints on sovereign decision-making operate as a mechanism to
control nationalist or socialist challenges from the periphery. Alternatively, as argued
by Asante and Sornarajah, long-term concessions that impact on fundamental aspects
of a States economy could be characterized as public law instruments.65 From this
point of view, the economic uncertainty underlying such long-term contracts means
that a degree of conflict between investor and government is bound to arise, and that it
should be managed by structured renegotiation rather than private law adjudication.
Rejecting this approach to State contracts in Texaco,66 Dupuy prioritized the binding
nature of a States contractual obligations over the special considerations that flow
from the uniqueness of the State as juridical entity.67
Even so, the impact of the Texaco award on Libyas freedom of governmental
action does not in itself amount to a full-scale retreat of the State because the frame-
work of juridical sovereignty remains intact. If one restricts the meaning of sovereignty
to that of formal status rather than actual power, then Dupuys interpretation of the
stabilization clause, as he noted, does not affect in principle the legislative and regu-
latory sovereignty of Libya. Closer to the mark for our purposes is Dupuys construc-
tion of an international legal order based on the theory of internationalized contracts.
In the case of either finding, to maintain the reciprocity of the private law relationship
the underlying theory of the decision either equates the juridical position of the sover-
eign to that of a private party, or it elevates private firms to a formal sovereign status
alongside the State.68 Neither is very satisfying in its definition of the public sphere
based on the uniqueness of the State. But this is not the key issue. The crucial signifi-
cance of Texacoand other arbitrations involving the interpretation of stabilization
clausesis not so much how the grey area between public and private is resolved but
by whom. The definition by arbitrators of the uniqueness of the State in these cases
supports in relation to matters of public law the wider claim that international arbitra-
tion is part of a legal order in which private actors formulate bodies of law without
direct supervision by the State.
Yet, regardless of whether the priorities of the global market require the use of
international commercial arbitration (rather than courts) to control juridical sover-
eigns, there is an important mitigating factor in contract-based arbitration that is
absent from treaty arbitration in relation to any retreat of the State from the field of
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adjudication. This is the specificity of the States consent. As noted, in commercial
arbitration, the State decides to submit to the authority of arbitrators in the context of
a particular transaction or relationship with a private party. The consent is not gener-
alized to a broad class of individuals who are affected by regulatory acts of the State.
This limits the scope of contract-based arbitration and the degree to which it impinges
on sovereign discretion, relative to a treaty-based consent that encompasses the full
range of the States regulatory relations with investors as a group. Thus, while inter-
national commercial arbitration may engage regulatory disputes, it is less firmly
entrenched in the public sphere than its investment treaty counterpart.
C. Investment Treaty Arbitration of Contractual Disputes
The view that investment treaty arbitration is a form of public law adjudication was
outlined above. In this section, the discussion focuses on a particular class of disputes
that come before tribunals established under investment treaties and that complicate the
characterization of investment treaty arbitration as public law. This challenge arises, in
particular, where investment treaties authorize the compulsory arbitration of disputes
arising from an alleged breach of contract by the State.
It is important to emphasize that most contract-related claims submitted to invest-
ment treaty arbitration remain quite clearly a matter of public law. The mere fact that
an investment treaty tribunal rules on a dispute that originates in a contract between an
investor and a State entity does not alter the public character of the arbitration. This is
because the obligations by which States are bound under the treaties, in their treatment
of investors, are intertwined with the sovereign authority of the State. Further, the acts
of the State that trigger such disputes are sovereign acts. Thus, a treaty may bind the
State as the sovereign in relation to contracts that it has entered into as a private party.
In most treaty arbitrations relating to a contract, the categories of sovereign and
commercial are relatively easy to make out. This is illustrated by the Wena Hotels arbi-
tration.69 In that case, the tribunal concluded that the conduct of an Egyptian State
company (EHC: the Egyptian Hotels Company) that had entered into a hotel lease with
a foreign companyand the delayed and inadequate response of the Egyptian author-
ities to that conductamounted to a violation of a bilateral investment treaty between
Egypt and the investors home State, the UK. As the tribunal found, in the course of a
disagreement between EHC and the investor, EHC encouraged and took part in the
seizure of the investors hotels. Buildings and furniture were ruined; agents and
employees of the investor were roughed up. In response, the Egyptian authorities
neglected to compel EHC to return the hotel property and compensate the investor for
its losses. This, the tribunal concluded, violated Egypts obligations under the treaty,
including its duties to ensure fair and equitable treatment, as well as full protection and
security, for investors. On this basis, Egypt was ordered to pay (US) $20 million in
damages.
The key here is that, although the dispute originated in a contract, this arbitration
revolved around matters of public law. It is true that the Egyptian State, via EHC, may
be seen to have acted in a private capacity when it entered into a hotel lease with the
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investor. But the liability of Egypt itself arose not from the acts of EHC per se but from
the failure of the Egyptian authorities to protect the investor from abuse. According to
the tribunal:70
there is substantial evidence that Egypt was aware of EHCs intentions to seize the hotels
and took no actions to prevent EHC from doing so. Moreover, once the seizures occurred,
both the police and the Ministry of Tourism took no immediate action to restore the hotels
promptly to Wenas control. Finally, Egypt never imposed substantial sanctions on EHC or
its senior officials, suggesting Egypts approval of EHCs actions.
The duties of Egypt to protect private property, and to condemn and punish the perpe-
trators of harm to private individuals, are sovereign duties flowing from the States
monopoly over the lawful use of force to maintain order. In the same vein, the treaty
obligations of a State to refrain from adopting regulatory measures that discriminate
against foreign investors, or to pay compensation for an expropriation of assets, are
quintessentially sovereign. In Wena Hotels, the terms of the contract between EHC and
the investor were a vital factual element in the dispute. But Egypts consent to arbitrate
remained a sovereign act just as Egypts failure to adequately protect the investor in its
dispute with ECH followed from Egypts unique status as the sovereign.
That said, there is a distinct class of investment treaty arbitrations in which the
dispute itself arises directly from an alleged breach of contract by the State. They
involve claims by investors pursuant to umbrella clauses contained in investment
treaties.71 Many investment treaties contain such clauses, which typically provide for
the States Parties to respect or observe or abide by all of their obligations and
commitments to foreign investors.72 A broad reading of such clauses is that they estab-
lish a general, overarching guarantee on the part of the State to any foreign investor that
has entered into a specific agreement with the State. On this interpretation, an umbrella
clause transforms a breach of contract by the State into an outright violation of the
treaty.73
Umbrella clauses put investment treaties into a potentially precarious position rela-
tive to domestic legal orders because they provide an additional avenue by which
private parties can seek redress for alleged breaches of contract by a State. Since the
umbrella clause is subject to dispute settlement under the treaty it may enable an
investor to bring a treaty claim alongside the causes of action available under the
contract. A treaty claim based on an umbrella clause may supplement contractual (or
other domestic) remedies. Besides certain complications that this creates for invest-
ment treaty provisions regarding the customary duty of foreign nationals to exhaust
local remedies before bringing an international claim, umbrella clauses introduce a
grey area in the classification of arbitration as public law. That is, is investment treaty
arbitration really a form of public law adjudication, one may ask, where the dispute has
arisen from an alleged breach of contract by the State but the States consent to arbi-
trate is contained in a treaty? Or does the fact that the dispute originates in a commer-
cial act of the State make this category of treaty arbitration a matter of private law?
388 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
70 Wena Hotels, ibid para 84. 71 UNCTAD (n 65) 1923.
72 AC Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment
Protection (2004) 20 Arbitration Intl 411, 41213.
73 J Karl, The Promotion and Protection of German Foreign Investment Abroad (1996) 11
ICSID RevFILJ 1, 23; C Schreuer, Travelling the BIT route: of waiting periods, umbrella
clauses and forks in the road (2004) 5 J World Investment and Trade 231, 250; FO Vicuña, Of
Contracts and Treaties in the Global Market (2004) 8 Max Planck Ybk UN Law 341.
D. The SGS Arbitrations
These questions were relevant to two arbitrations against Pakistan and the Philippines,
respectively, under separate investment treaties, initiated by the same Swiss investor,
Société Générale de Surveillance SA (SGS).74 In both cases, the States treaty-based
consent to the jurisdiction of the tribunal and to the umbrella clause in the treaty was a
sovereign act, while the act triggering the dispute was an alleged breach of contract by
the State, ie a commercial act.
In SGS v Pakistan, SGS claimed that Pakistan had violated an umbrella clause in its
bilateral investment treaty with Switzerland, which obliged Pakistan to constantly
guarantee the observance of its commitments to Swiss investors. SGS had concluded
a contract with the Government of Pakistan to provide pre-inspection services for
customs control. The contractual relationship broke down, prompting an (unsuccessful)
action by SGS in the Swiss courts, and the initiation by Pakistan of arbitration in
Pakistan in accordance with the dispute settlement clause of the contract. SGS coun-
tered with an international claim of breach of contract pursuant to the treatys umbrella
clause. After assessing the claim, the tribunal in SGS v Pakistan declined to assert juris-
diction, finding that the wording of the umbrella clause was not sufficiently clear and
specific to convert Pakistans contractual duties into treaty obligations.75 As discussed
below, this reading effectively limited the potential encroachment of treaty arbitration
into the private sphere of contractual disputes out of respect for the integrity of the
domestic legal order.76
We may compare this to the arbitration in SGS v Philippines, in which another
tribunal reached a very different conclusion as to whether umbrella clauses can found
the jurisdiction of a treaty tribunal over investor claims of breach of contract by the
State. In this case, SGS had entered into a contract with the Government of the
Philippines for the provision of import supervision services. SGS claimed inter alia that
the Philippines breached the contract and filed a claim under a SwissPhilippines invest-
ment treaty. The treaty contained an umbrella clause that required the Philippines to
observe any obligation it assumed with respect to investments of Swiss investors within
its territory. The tribunal took note of, and rejected in strong language, the reasoning of
the award in SGS v Pakistan, stating that the earlier tribunal had failed to give any clear
meaning to the umbrella clause  in the SwissPakistan treaty. The SGS v Philippines
tribunal then concluded that the applicable umbrella clause made it a violation of the
treaty for the Philippines to breach a binding contractual commitment to a Swiss
investor. On this basis, the tribunal assumed jurisdiction over SGSs claims of breach of
contract by the Philippines, although it declined to exercise that jurisdiction until after
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claims made by the contracting partiespursuant to the dispute settlement mechanism
of the contractwere themselves resolved.
There are various explanations for why these two tribunals arrived at different
conclusions, most of which are not directly relevant to the publicprivate dimension at
the heart of this paper. For one, the wording of the respective umbrella clauses was
different. In SGS v Pakistan, the States Parties were obliged to constantly guarantee
the observance of commitments, whereas in SGS v Philippines each was required to
observe any obligation it has assumed. The latter phrase, as noted by the SGS v
Philippines tribunal, is a bit more categorical.77 On the other hand, both clauses also
raise the possibility that the States general consent to treaty arbitration encapsulated a
consent to arbitrate disputes arising from breach of contract by the State.
More important for the present inquiry are divergences in the tribunals characteri-
zation of the purpose of investment treaties. In SGS v Pakistan, the tribunal expressed
its aim to avoid a clash between what it regarded as distinct bodies of law; that is,
between treaty and contract. The tribunal reasoned that umbrella clauses should be
read in such a way as to enhance mutuality and balance of benefits in the inter-relation
of different agreements located in differing legal orders. The danger, for the tribunal,
was that an expansive reading of the umbrella clause would amount to incorporating
by reference an unlimited number of State commitments including unilateral commit-
ments to an investor of the other Contracting Party . . ..78 In showing restraint in this
fashion, the tribunal drew on a distinction between the domestic and international
sphere. However, given the facts, its rationale also differentiated sovereign acts from
private acts of the State. In doing so, the tribunal indirectly preserved the integrity of
treaty arbitration as a public law adjudicative system by limiting the ability of
investors to bring treaty claims based on breach of contract. The umbrella clause, in
effect, simply did not permit tribunals to rule on commercial acts of the State.
These concerns were rejected in SGS v Philippines, where the tribunal roundly
dismissed the apprehension that a broad interpretation of an umbrella clause entailed
the full-scale internationalisation of domestic contracts.79 Instead, the tribunal distin-
guished the issues of the scope and content of a States contractual obligations from the
performance of those obligations, once ascertained. The issue of performance was
found to be subject to treaty arbitration, while the former issues were not. Thus, the
umbrella clause allowed the tribunal to rule on a claim that the Philippines had not
performed its contractual obligations, although the scope and content of those obliga-
tions remained subject to the contract. This prompted the tribunal to refrain from ruling
on the treaty claim until the applicable contractual remedies ran their course. In this
case, the contract provided that its provisions were governed in all respects by the
laws of the Philippines, and that any disputes under the contract were to be filed in the
courts of the Philippines.80
Whether this distinction between the scope and the performance of an obligation
ultimately addresses the concerns of the SGS v Pakistan tribunal is difficult to say in
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the absence of an award on the merits in SGS v Philippines. Of primary interest here is
that it is not possible to limit issues of a States performance of a contract to the public
realm in light of the uniqueness of juridical sovereign. Any private party is capable of
performing a contract. As such, the approach in SGS v Philippines constitutes treaty
arbitration more clearly as a form of adjudication in the private sphere, by allowing an
investors claim of breach of contract to proceed against the State. In contrast, in SGS
v Pakistan, the tribunal rejected this outcome in order to maintain the autonomies of
the worlds of treaty and contract.
A practical difficulty with reading umbrella clauses to allow the treaty arbitration of
private law claims against the State is that umbrella clauses may require States to abide
by contractual commitments regardless of the agreed choice of forum, as determined
by the contract itself. This returns us to the question of whether an umbrella clause,
given its generality, simply aggregates and internationalizes the contractual duties of
the State. If so, then a breach of the umbrella clause surely depends on an interpreta-
tion of all of the terms and conditions of the contract, including its provisions on
dispute settlement. As intimated by the SGS v Philippines tribunal, how can a State fail
to perform a contractual commitment, and violate an umbrella clause, unless the
investor had already impugned the State by successfully bringing a claim under the
dispute settlement mechanism of the contract? To permit investor claims to proceed
based on an umbrella clause in the treaty, independent of previously agreed dispute
settlement provisions in the contract, fails to interpret the commitments of the State
based on the contract as a whole. It is a selective approach to the incorporation of
disputes arising from commercial acts of the State into the realm of treaty arbitration.
This leads us to the underlying publicprivate concern with respect to an interpre-
tation of umbrella clauses that allows treaty-based arbitration of private law claims
against the State. With an umbrella clause in a treaty, the States consent is not limited
to a single relationship or transaction with another private party. Rather, it extends in
principle to any claim by an investor of alleged breach of contract by the State. The
generality of the States consent may indeed suffice to constitute an adjudication based
on that consent as public law in light of the intimate connection between the consent
itself and the uniqueness of the State as a representative entity. That is, it is difficult to
conceive of a private party giving consent to abide by all of its commitments with
respect to other private parties within its jurisdiction in the manner of a State.
This application of the publicprivate distinction does not mean that an umbrella
clause should be read as imposing no obligation whatsoever on the State. It means
simply that an obligation assumed in an investment treaty should be read in light of the
generality of the States commitment. One might, for instance, interpret umbrella
clauses as imposing obligations which are distinguishable as sovereign duties from the
contractual obligations to which they relate, as well as from other sovereign obligations
under the treaty (ie to ensure full protection and security or to refrain from expropria-
tion without compensation). On this reading, a breach of contract by the State would
violate the treaty only to the extent that the States compliance with the contract flowed
from a duty of the State that could not attach to any private party. This would extend
the scope of investment treaty arbitration into the realm of contract-based adjudication,
but only to the extent that commercial arbitration is itself used to resolve regulatory
disputes, as in the case of a stabilization clause in a contract.81 Thus, the range of
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disputes that would be arbitrable under an umbrella clause would broadly coincide with
the States capability to use international commercial arbitration as a governing
arrangement in itself. The main difference between the two would continue to be the
degree of specificity of the States consent to abide by its public law obligations, as
governed by the contract. But, by limiting the encroachment of treaty arbitration on the
private sphere, its integrity as public law adjudication would be preserved, with a corre-
sponding limit on the generalized liability of States for commercial acts.
Of course, there are other interpretive options; one need not equate the duties
imposed by umbrella clauses to contractual obligations that are themselves sovereign
in character. The idea is to interpret a treaty obligation of a State to abide by its contrac-
tual commitments in light of the wide-ranging nature of such an obligation. Another
way to do so is to interpret umbrella clauses as simply imposing an obligation of sover-
eign non-interference with the resort by investors to the dispute settlement mechanisms
of their contracts with the State.82 On this basis, the obligation would link the duty of
States to refrain from denying justice to foreign nationals to the terms of specifically
agreed dispute settlement provisions. Alternatively, establishing a breach of the treaty
obligation by the State might require evidence of malicious interference with a specific
contract by the State, or intentional breach of statutory or prerogative powers, consis-
tent with elements of the common law tort of misfeasance in a public office.83 In either
case, the obligations imposed by umbrella clauses are conceived of in terms of a regu-
latory duty of the State to observe its obligations in general, rather than an all-encom-
passing obligation to respect every single commitment entered into by the State in a
private capacity. The duty of States is to refrain from using their sovereign powers to
escape from contractual commitments.84
V. CONCLUSION
The rise of international arbitration in the resolution of individual claims against States
does not alter the fact that adjudication goes to the core of juridical sovereignty. For the
same reason, though, the claim that the rise of international commercial arbitration
signals a retreat of the State from its classical role in relation to adjudication is exag-
gerated. Where the courts endorsement of arbitration is limited to commercial disputes
between private parties, even if one party happens to be a State entity, the State never-
theless retains its control over the recognition of party autonomy and of the right of
individuals to eschew the courts in favour of arbitration. An exception arises in inter-
national commercial arbitration when the State agrees to contractual provisions that
purport to bind the State in a sovereign capacity. In particular, the interpretation of
stabilization clauses permits arbitrators to resolve the conundrum of how a private act
of the State can operate to bind sovereign conduct, and thus to delineate the legal scope
of the public sphere.
Even so, the State retains significant control over the delegation of this public law
competence to arbitrators by the States consideration of whether to enter into specific
contracts with foreign firms. Investment treaties alter this dynamic. As I have argued,
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investment treaty arbitration is a type of public law adjudication, both because it is
established by a sovereign act of the State and because it is used to resolve regulatory
disputes. Thus, the rulings of arbitrators pursuant to investment treaties are unlike
conventional awards issued in the arbitration of disputes between juridical equals. They
involve governmental choices that are akin to the judicial determination of individual
property and economic rights in domestic public law. To reduce investment treaty arbi-
tration to a category of international commercial arbitration is to understate its trans-
formative impact.
The importance of the publicprivate distinction in international arbitration is not
what it tells us about sovereignty in general, but what it reveals about the role played
by arbitrators in interpreting questions of public law that were previously determined
by the courts. The lesson of Texaco is that an arbitrator may interpret a stabilization
clause in a contract broadly so as to constitute arbitration as a method of government.
Likewise, the SGS arbitrations show that arbitrators may read umbrella clauses in an
investment treaty in a manner that converts a contractual breach by the State into an
international wrong. The former extends the reach of private law adjudication into the
public sphere; the latter does essentially the opposite. In both cases, though, the end
result is the same: arbitrators exercise the authority to expand their competence over
individual claims against the State, in the foggy borderland between the worlds of
public and private. The tension and uncertainty generated by the publicprivate distinc-
tion is nothing new in adjudication.85 What is exceptional is that private contractors
rather than tenured judges are left to manage the legal construction of the public sphere,
without rigorous supervision by courts. The ultimate authority to determine what
juridical sovereignty means is itself privatized.
Under investment treaties, as noted, States delegate to arbitrators a comprehensive
jurisdiction over individual claims against the State, thus relinquishing the ability of the
State to limit the use of arbitration in public law to specific contracts and legal rela-
tionships. For this reason, the retreat of the State from classical adjudication is more
decisive and wide-ranging in the case of investment treaty arbitration than in interna-
tional commercial arbitration. With the former, States have delegated comprehensive
jurisdiction over public law to a small group of legal service providers who operate in
an international market for private adjudication.86 The appropriateness of this develop-
ment has not been the focus of this article. Yet, it is important to note that the security
of tenure of judges is a key pillar of their independence from both executive govern-
ment and wealthy litigants. Further, because in international treaty arbitration it is
exclusively private parties who bring the claims and who activate the system as an
alternative to the courts, all arbitrators may be seen to have a commercial interest in
expanding the scope and remedial power of the system so that arbitration may thrive as
a business. More than anything, then, the significance of international arbitration in the
retreat of the State is its institutional entrenchment of an uncomfortable union between
adjudication-as-business and public law.
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